The good old days of US-EU ties are over

The European Union is likely to find that Biden represents a welcome return to civilised cooperation on a range of issues, but will see he too will place America first, possibly continuing many of the tariffs imposed by the previous administration.

For his part, Biden will find an EU no longer exclusively waiting for US initiatives, one that now attempts to lead the way. It spent the previous four years formulating and constructing more independent policies, some of which have matured to the point they are being implemented today.

After the ground in US-European relations fundamentally shifted under Donald Trump, it will not re-settle back in the place it was before. The “good old days” of an ultra-special relationship with Europe are likely over.

If Biden’s background is instructive, it shows a man formed in part by blue-collar values. Born in prosaic Scranton, Pennsylvania, his father and mother fell on hard economic times just about the time he was born. A few years later, they moved to Delaware where the senior Joe Biden for whom the president is named eventually found success as a used car salesman.

While partly a product of a working class background, the future senator, vice-president and president would be given a new Corvette sports car by his father as a wedding present in 1967, not really the experience of many blue collar offspring. Yet he drove it like a true son of the American road, admitting that when young he “buried the pin” on the speedometer, taking it to speeds of 160mph, close to 200 kph. He still has the car today.

He might be the closest thing to a “working class” president in many decades. Of the previous six presidents — a period stretching back 44 years — the Bush and Trump families are outright multimillionaires, Obama is a supremely gifted, entirely atypical story in American politics, Clinton attended Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, Reagan was a movie star and even Carter was of an elite class: A PhD in nuclear physics, no less.

So Biden’s personal DNA could actually enable him to better relate to the working man, not just claim it in rhetoric and for political gain. As a result, he could be more protectionist than readily known, prepared to truly place America first when it comes to trade with Europe or any place else.

Like Scranton, his political life has also been a bit gritty at times: An inheritor of politically correct Democratic Party policies, he is known for his sometimes-sharp jabs and occasional gaffs.

To close some of the rifts in America, Biden will have to convince those now alienated that their concerns are as important as meeting international obligations, if not more so. Not since Lyndon Johnson a president the US had a with such deep experience in legislation, which is often the art of compromise. That background could provide the ability to draw in more of the disaffected.

For Europe it could mean a less international America. Since the end of WWII and the ensuing Cold War, the US was the guarantor of European security, a supporter of European integration, and a pivotal partner in global affairs. Over the last four years, much of that support evaporated.

The two sides of the Atlantic will no doubt re-engage, but it takes two to make a partnership. What has Europe been up to and what does it want? Though many talk of the decline of America, Europe has been struggling since the Great Recession of 2008. It is fundamentally weaker than it was 13 years ago, mostly due to its own structural flaws.

In early 2008 the EU’s economy was slightly larger than its counterpart in the US and both were much larger than China’s. By 2019, the American economy had grown by around 50 per cent while the EU had stagnated. Since 2010, the US share of the global economy increased from 23 per cent to 25 per cent while Europe, including Britain, shrank from 21.5 per cent to 17.5 per cent.

With its erstwhile partner America suddenly unreliable under Trump, the EU and its member nations considered their options. Even with Biden’s inauguration only weeks away, the bloc signed a new economic agreement with China. The exact text of the pact has yet to be finalised, but it signifies a deeper “values-based investment relationship” that the EU says will hold China accountable in the global order, part of its mission to make itself a regulatory superpower.

But many think the deal came from EU weakness, not strength. Recent surveys have shown Europeans think China will surpass the US in the near future and also fear that American voters could again elect a nationalistic populist, so they opted for a cozier relationship with America’s main economic rival. With its disposable per capita income rising, China could one day be a more reliable consumer of European cars, cheese, wine and olive oil than America.

Cleary Biden will need to reaffirm America’s historical ties to Europe and try to rebuild the transatlantic relationship. That should be relatively straightforward when it comes to NATO and the Paris Climate Accord. But presenting united front on China or other issues could be increasingly difficult.

And perhaps that is as it should be. Forged in WWII and the Cold War, the transatlantic connection was what would be called a codependent relationship today. Not based on mutual affection but instead a leader-client arrangement, it is no longer healthy. Some 75 years after WWII it has lost its original purpose.

Jon Van Housen and Mariella Radaelli are journalists based in Milan